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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Lawyers and accountants, the transactional engineers of Ameri-
can business, are accustomed to thinking of different forms of busi-
ness organization as planning opportunities. If they are savvy, they 
also see them as marketing opportunities. Clients may be persuaded 
to trade in their old forms for a new and improved model. These so-
phisticated form entrepreneurs see what state legislatures have al-
ways known but rarely articulated: organizational forms are prod-
ucts that trade in a market. The law is for sale, not that there’s any-
thing wrong with that.1 
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor of Law, Florida State University. B.A., Radcliffe College, 1966; J.D., 
University of Santa Clara, 1973. I would like to thank Donald J. Weidner, Steven A. Bank, 
and John W. Larson for their comments on an earlier draft and Matthew Lines and Jason 
Doss for their research assistance. 
 1. Over the years, a number of commentators have thought something was very 
wrong with that. Delaware, which has been particularly successful in this market, has 
been the most frequent target for criticism. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Delaware Law As 
Applied Public Choice Theory: Bill Cary and the Basic Course After Twenty-Five Years, 34 
GA. L. REV. 447 (2000); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974) (characterizing Delaware as the winner of the “race 
for the bottom”); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 
1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969). Those critiques have in turn provoked defenses. See, 
e.g., John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Sci-
entific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271 (2000); several pieces by Roberta Romano, but par-
ticularly Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
225 (1985) and Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 
FORDHAM L. REV. 843 (1993); and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, 
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). 
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 Until fairly recently, the options available in the business organi-
zations market were somewhat limited. Sole proprietorships existed 
as a default choice, but—at least for form merchants—such busi-
nesses were simply targets of opportunity; sole proprietorships were 
corporations-in-waiting.2 Limited partnerships were primarily used 
for tax shelters (remember tax shelters?) and continued to be sold to 
that segment of the market involved with real estate. For most other 
businesses, however, the forms market consisted of partnership or 
incorporation, although the availability of out-of-state incorporation 
did at least offer variations on the latter theme. 
 Those forms had both advantages and disadvantages. The part-
nership form offered flexibility, informality, and pass-through taxa-
tion, but exposed the partners’ personal assets to the risks of the 
business3 and could not be used by sole proprietors.4 The limited 
partnership conferred its liability shield at the price of active partici-
pation in management.5 The corporation required adherence to statu-
tory norms; a casual approach to corporate formalities could result in 
the loss of limited liability6 or the inability to enforce a shareholder 
agreement.7 In any event, incorporation introduced tax complica-
tions. In short, there was no such thing as the perfect transactional 
vehicle. 
 Of course, business lawyers and accountants were fully aware of 
these imperfections and put their considerable talents to work in try-
ing to cure them. Some of those efforts resulted in a major overhaul 
of an “old” form, the partnership.8 However, that overhaul did not 
                                                                                                                    
 For purposes of this Article, whether the law “ought” to be a product which trades in a 
market is not at issue. Both the critics and the defenders agree that, as things stand, it is a 
product and that form consumers have opportunities for form shopping. 
 2. Incorporated sole proprietors who wanted to avoid double taxation at the federal 
level could do so with planning. State tax avoidance sometimes required more complex 
strategies, but this just increased the need for the planners’ services. I am indebted to my 
colleague Steve Bank for sharing with me his experiences in such planning and his wry ob-
servation that clients were at times amazingly willing to spend large amounts of money on 
legal fees to avoid small amounts of taxes or filing fees. Behavioral economists studying 
bounded rationality might usefully consider adding a “government aversion effect” to their 
list of cognitive biases. 
 3. U.P.A. §§ 13-15 (1914) (making partners jointly and severally liable for a partner’s 
tort or breach of trust and jointly liable on partnership contracts). 
 4. Id. § 6 (defining partnership as an “association of two or more persons”). 
 5. U.L.P.A. § 7 (1916); R.U.L.P.A. (1976) (amended 1985). RULPA permits limited 
partners to do quite a lot without losing their liability shield, but they still may not par-
ticipate in control. A proposed revision to RULPA would eliminate that restriction. 
R.U.L.P.A. § 303 (Tentative Draft, 2001). 
 6. Failure to observe corporate formalities frequently appears on the list of reasons 
to pierce the corporate veil, although it is difficult to tell whether that—or any other stated 
reason—actually produces the result. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate 
Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991). 
 7. See, e.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234 (N.Y. 1934) and its progeny. 
 8. R.U.P.A. (1996) (amended 1997). Although the formal title of the statute does not 
include the word “revised,” the new model statute is universally referred to and usually 
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solve the problem of the partners’ unlimited personal liability, nor 
did it afford total flexibility in structuring the deal.9 The search for 
the perfect transactional form continued. 
 Perfection is an elusive goal. So far, at least, no one has invented 
a form that meets everyone’s needs.10 Instead, over the last several 
years, we have seen a proliferation of business forms that has dra-
matically altered the landscape. Now, in addition to partnerships, 
limited partnerships, and corporations, we have limited liability 
partnerships (LLPs), limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs), 
and limited liability companies (LLCs). State-to-state variation in 
those new forms makes life even more exciting for those who thrive 
on complexity. 
 Although Florida was an early entrant in the forms market, it has 
only recently become competitive. Florida was fairly quick to adopt 
RUPA, albeit with some tinkering.11 However, it was not until 1999 
that Florida adopted LLP provisions12 and an LLC statute13 that had 
any hope of being widely used. 
 The new LLP provisions are not all that different from anyone 
else’s. They constitute, if you like, a generic. That generic will be 
bought in Florida by people who want to do business in that form, 
and Florida will collect the filing fees. The new LLC statute, how-
                                                                                                                    
cited as the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, or “RUPA.” As of 2001, the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act had been adopted, with occasional variations, in 30 states (including Flor-
ida) and the District of Columbia. 
 9. RUPA’s drafters considered, but ultimately rejected, giving the parties complete 
freedom of contract. See infra text accompanying note 32. 
 10. Although one author claims that Texas has done so. Thomas F. Blackwell, The 
Revolution is Here: The Promise of a Unified Business Entity Code, 24 J. CORP. L. 333 
(1999). I might consider this to be just another example of Texan hubris, were it not that 
(1) Mr. Blackwell might be right, my doubts to the contrary not withstanding, and (2) no 
one who starts an article with a citation to a Beatles song can be fairly accused of taking 
himself too seriously. 
 11. FLA. STAT. §§ 620.81001-620.9902 (adopted in 1995). The legislature was un-
doubtedly assisted in its deliberations by the fact that RUPA’s Reporters were both on the 
faculty at Florida State University. For a comprehensive discussion of the process and its 
results, see John W. Larson, Florida’s New Partnership Law: The Revised Uniform Part-
nership Act and Limited Liability Partnerships, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 201 (1995). 
 12. Florida adopted LLP provisions in 1995, but they were not “full shield.” Partners 
were protected from tort liability but not from obligations arising from contracts. Florida 
also required professionals either to buy liability insurance or post a bond. Foreign LLPs 
could register in the state, although they had to comply with the insurance requirements 
for Florida partners. Nevertheless, since most foreign statutes provided a full liability 
shield, those Florida partnerships that wanted completely limited liability bought the for-
eign product. Those competitive disadvantages were eliminated in 1999; Florida LLPs are 
now full shield and insurance is not required. FLA. STAT. § 620.8306 (2001). 
 13. Although Florida was the second state to adopt an LLC statute, Florida Limited 
Liability Company Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 608.401-608.514 (1982), that statute was the busi-
ness form version of an Edsel. Nobody bought it. Single member LLCs were not permitted 
and (the coup de grace) LLCs were taxed as corporations. While Florida rejoices in the ab-
sence of a personal income tax, it does have a corporate income tax. In 1997-98 those im-
pediments were removed, setting the stage for a more thoroughgoing revision. 
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ever, is a brand new product. In fact, it is unique. No other state has 
produced anything exactly like it. For that reason, it is worth explor-
ing in some depth. Has Florida built a better organizational form, 
and if so, how is it better? And what does “better” mean? 
 For the purposes of this Article, I assume that form consumers 
(business people) already know they want limited liability14 and pass-
through taxation. I also assume that they can get both through any 
one of several forms.15 While some professionals may face regulatory 
constraints on their choice of form (for example, lawyers may not be 
permitted to organize under the general corporation law),16 neverthe-
less, for most form consumers, external relationships, with creditors 
or the government, will not drive the choice of form. 
 What, then, does? Why should form consumers buy, or form en-
trepreneurs recommend, the Florida LLC? Or, conversely, why might 
they prefer to shop elsewhere? The answer to those questions, it 
seems to me, may lie in the governance provisions of the statute 
which regulate the distribution of power within businesses using 
that form.17 
 Participants in a firm18 know that business life is uncertain and 
that contingency planning is expensive and in any event only works 
                                                                                                                    
 14. Not all business people do want limited liability. Although accounting firms have 
apparently converted to LLPs en masse, not all law firms have done so. The reason for that 
is surely not that they do not know they could. Instead, staying a full-liability partnership 
may serve as a signal to the market for legal services that the partners stand behind the 
quality of their work. It is, in effect, a bonding mechanism in a lemons market. See Charles 
R. O’Kelley, Jr., Opting In and Out of Fiduciary Duties In Cooperative Ventures: Refining 
the So-Called Coasean Contract Theory, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 353 (1992). 
 15. There are still some federal tax wrinkles lurking in “check the box,” and there are 
also tax implications in converting from a previous form to a new one. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 
§ 301.7701-3(g)(1) (2001) and proposed amendments thereto. State taxes may also make a 
difference; for example, Florida’s intangibles tax applies to interests in an LLC but not a 
limited partnership. Tax law may therefore drive the choice of form at the margin, but 
should not affect the decision to become a Florida LLC as opposed to, say, a Delaware LLC. 
Filing fees may also drive choices at the margin, even when, rationally, they should not. 
See supra note 2. 
 16. While these professional restrictions strike me as somewhat silly once full shield 
limited liability is deemed acceptable, they do exist. 
 17. A sole proprietor does not have to worry about intra-firm governance unless she 
foresees bringing in equity participants in the future, and she can always switch forms 
later. I assume, therefore, that the sole proprietor’s decision to form an LLC rather than an 
S corporation will be made solely by reference to their relative transaction costs and tax 
differentials, and the advantage seems clearly to be with the LLC. 
 Many large corporations are also using the LLC for their wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
Single member LLCs are disregarded entities for tax purposes, so the parent corporation 
achieves de facto consolidation without having to comply with the tax regulations govern-
ing consolidated returns. 
 In any event, it does not really matter which state’s LLC form the sole proprietor or cor-
porate parent chooses unless that state is particularly prone to veil piercing. Thus, those 
form consumers might as well shop at home. 
 18. I use the word “firm” in its economic sense to describe an enterprise that requires 
team production. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), re-
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when contingencies can be foreseen. Decisions will have to be made 
in the future about products, services, assets, production or provision 
methods, and the allocation of benefits or burdens.19 Statutory gov-
ernance provisions in turn tell us a lot about who gets to make the 
decisions, who gets to complain about them, and whose complaints 
have teeth. To the extent that firm organizers do not like the an-
swers the statute provides, they may be permitted to draft around it 
(although this in itself incurs costs), or they may choose another 
form. 
 This Article focuses on the governance provisions of Florida’s Lim-
ited Liability Company Act and compares them to the governance 
provisions generally available in other business forms. As will be 
seen, the statutory language is not always clear, so alternative inter-
pretations are explored. The Article concludes that the new Florida 
statute is a major improvement over its predecessor. It will suit form 
consumers and form merchants in the vast transactional middle, the 
world of the “plain vanilla” deal. However, (1) it is likely to serve as a 
trap for the unwary who form an LLC without professional assis-
tance, and (2) it is unlikely to displace its out-of-state competition for 
high stakes, complex deals in which the parties need (or think they 
need) unlimited freedom to contract. 
II. THE FLORIDA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT 
 Limited liability companies are often referred to as “hybrid” busi-
ness forms. They look a little like both of their parents, partnerships 
and corporations, but are not quite either one.20 Like corporations, a 
filing is required; an LLC may not be formed with a handshake.21 
                                                                                                                    
printed in R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 (1988). Some or all par-
ticipants may supply human capital; some or all may supply money or other property. A 
central problem with firm production is that team members have incentives to prefer their 
own self-interest to that of the team if they can do so without paying the full costs of self- 
preferring behavior. A vast literature has grown up around the “theory of the firm” and its 
associated agency costs. For starters, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The-
ory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305 (1976). At the moment, an interesting debate has sprung up over who “counts” 
as a member of the team. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production The-
ory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Symposium, Team Production in Business 
Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743 (1999). While I find all this fascinating 
(I am, after all, an academic), for purposes of this Article the only team members who 
count are those with the power to choose the organizational form. 
 19. Business enterprisers may have a cognitive bias that makes them happy to think 
about benefits (profits) and disinclined to think about burdens (losses). Lawyers who insist 
on planning for the down side may therefore be seen as “deal killers,” but it goes with the 
territory. 
 20. They also sometimes look a lot like limited partnerships, themselves a “hybrid.” 
 21. Or by accident. The fact that there is no such thing as an “inadvertent” LLC may 
justify some departures from the partnership model. Claire Moore Dickerson, Equilibrium 
Destabilized: Fiduciary Duties Under the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 25 
STETSON L. REV. 417, 425, 434-35 (1995). 
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Like partnerships, an LLC can be “member managed,” although par-
ticipants may choose to be “manager managed.”22 Hybrids can be 
both vigorous and useful, as Luther Burbank discovered. On the 
other hand, taking some of this and some of that can produce some 
startling results. 
 Florida’s LLC governance provisions take managers’ duties from 
partnership law, albeit with a twist. They add the protections against 
liability for breach of those duties granted by Florida’s corporation 
statute, along with that statute’s procedures for “sanitizing” conflict 
of interest transactions and for indemnification.23 Finally, voting and 
withdrawal rights parallel such rights in corporations rather than 
partnerships. The following sections examine each provision, its ap-
parent provenance, and its interaction with the other provisions. 
A. Duties and Obligations of Managers 
 As noted above, the duties of managers in a Florida LLC were 
drawn from the Florida version of RUPA, but with some changes. 
FRUPA in turn adopted RUPA’s codification of fiduciary duties, but 
also with some changes. The final product presents a puzzle: do LLC 
managers have more fiduciary duties than do partners, or the same, 
or fewer, or (perhaps) none at all? 
 In order to see the contours of the puzzle, some history is re-
quired. The LLC statute has no legislative history of its own. When 
courts interpret borrowed language, they frequently look to the his-
tory of the statute from which it is borrowed. Thus, the Official 
Comments to RUPA become an important resource for planners and 
potential litigants.24 
1. RUPA  
 The Revised Uniform Partnership Act’s treatment of fiduciary du-
ties was by far the most controversial issue in the revision.25 Its 
predecessor, the Uniform Partnership Act, made no attempt to codify 
fiduciary duties. In fact, the word “fiduciary” appears in the UPA 
only once, in the title to section 21, which provides that a partner 
must “account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee 
for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other 
                                                                                                                    
 22. In a partnership, the default rule is that all partners have equal rights in the 
management of the business, so that all partners are also managers. However, partners 
may, by agreement, delegate management to fewer than all partners, and that is quite 
common in large partnerships. 
 23. FLA. STAT. §§ 608.4223, 608.4225-608.4226, 608.4235 (2001).  
 24. STUART R. COHN & STUART D. AMES, FLORIDA BUSINESS LAWS ANNOTATED 201 
(2002) [hereinafter COHN & AMES]. 
 25. ROBERT W. HILLMAN ET AL., THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 201-202 
(2000). 
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partners from any transaction connected with the formation, con-
duct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its 
property.”26 
 Courts did not find it necessary to rely on this language in con-
structing an elaborate and open-ended structure of fiduciary duties. 
In erecting that structure, judges enlarged upon, and then embroi-
dered, the basic themes of care, loyalty, good faith, and disclosure.27 
Indeed, it has sometimes seemed that “fiduciary” was something a 
judge called a defendant just before the defendant lost, usually citing 
Meinhard v. Salmon.28 
 Whether in fact what might be called “galloping Meinhardism” 
produced tough liability standards or merely tough rhetoric, and 
whether fiduciary duties should be all that tough in the first place, 
was and is open to debate.29 That debate pits the traditionalists, who 
see fiduciary duties as a moral mandate,30 against the contractarians, 
who see them as default terms in a standard form contract which the 
parties should be free to vary.31 The drafters of RUPA decided to 
steer a middle course, thus guaranteeing that it would be shot at by 
the partisans of both camps.32 
                                                                                                                    
 26.  U.P.A. § 21 (1914). 
 27. Courts did not create these duties out of whole cloth. The law of agency furnished 
the basic material. 
 28. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). Judge Cardozo announced in ringing language that fi-
duciaries must behave with a “punctilio of an honor the most sensitive” and that the “re-
lentless and supreme” duty of undivided loyalty requires that “thought of self” be re-
nounced. Id. at 546, 548. His language has acquired a life of its own. For example, at least 
one Florida judge has thought that the mere invocation of Meinhard, a 74 year old, 4-3 de-
cision about a partnership opportunity, sufficed to resolve a much different issue—the de-
cision of a New York law firm to close its Florida office. Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wicker-
sham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 “AJ,” 1996 WL 438777, at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 728 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). For two quite different 
academic views of the Beasley case, compare Allan W. Vestal, “Assume a Rather Large 
Boat...”: The Mess We Have Made of Partnership Law, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487 (1997) 
(supporting the trial judge’s opinion), with Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA and Fi-
duciary Duty, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877 (1997) (critiquing the trial judge’s opinion). 
 29. Robert W. Hillman, Business Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on the Limits of 
Doctrine, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 51 (2000). 
 30. The “moral mandate” characterization is Hillman’s. Id. passim. 
 31. This view is associated with the “law and economics” movement. One hallmark of 
this mode of thinking is a preference for contract over tort (or in this case, the “tort like,” 
since fiduciary duties are creatures of equity rather than law). As will no doubt become 
clear, my own perspective is strongly contractarian. 
 32. More recently, a new camp has emerged. This camp might be called the “commu-
nitarian instrumentalists.” Members of this group do not reject economic analysis, but seek 
to use the insights of behavioral economics to support other-regarding legal norms. See, 
e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral 
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001). Professors Blair and Stout 
have been in the vanguard of this group, and their work has attracted considerable atten-
tion. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 18. It has not, however, achieved universal approba-
tion. The contractarians have not jumped on board and are unlikely to do so, while at the 
other end of the spectrum, their work has been critiqued as insufficiently progressive. 
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 RUPA attempts to limit judicial inventiveness by stating that 
there are only two fiduciary duties owed by partners to each other: 
the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.33 Those duties are exclusive; 
there are two, count them, two. The duties of disclosure and good 
faith have been demoted (or, for contractarians, appropriately con-
fined) to mere “obligations,” of which more anon. 
 The duties of care and loyalty are both exclusive and exclusively 
defined. First, they are temporally limited to the “conduct and wind-
ing up” of the partnership’s business and do not apply to the pre-
formation negotiation period.34 
 Second, the duty of care is limited to refraining from grossly neg- 
ligent conduct,35 reckless conduct (which seems superfluous),36 and 
intentional misconduct or knowing violation of law (which merely 
seems odd).37 
                                                                                                                    
David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production 
Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001 (2000). 
 33. R.U.P.A. § 404 (a) (1996) (amended 1997). 
 34. Id. § 404(b)(1). Under the UPA, the duty to account extends to misconduct in con-
nection with the “formation” of a partnership. U.P.A. § 21 (1914). Under the UPA, there-
fore, “pre-partners” have fiduciary duties to each other during the negotiation process that 
“pre-agents” generally do not have to potential principals, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 390 (1958), and “pre-incorporators,” a.k.a. promoters, have only sometimes, and 
then only if the corporation is actually formed.  
 Courts have sometimes, but not invariably, used pre-formation duties to impose liability 
on partners who personally benefitted from information obtained in the negotiation process 
or failed to disclose something important, at least in hindsight, about contributed property. 
See, e.g., Corley v. Ott, 485 S.E.2d 97 (S.C. 1997). Thus, information that is voluntarily dis-
closed during pre-partnership negotiations may be subject to a duty of confidentiality, even 
if the parties have not signed a confidentiality agreement. Conversely, disclosure may be 
compelled even when parties dealing at arm’s length would be free to remain silent. 
 Like almost everything else in RUPA’s treatment of fiduciary duties, the elimination of 
pre-formation duties has been both attacked and defended. For what it is worth, it has al-
ways seemed a trifle odd to me that parties negotiating a deal may have fiduciary duties 
while negotiating (or not), depending on the business form ultimately chosen for that deal, 
which may itself be the subject of negotiation. Since, ex ante, the parties cannot know 
whether they are fiduciaries, it seems to me that any sensible business person would re-
fuse to disclose valuable information without a confidentiality agreement in place. While 
demanding such an agreement may erode trust, it may also usefully prevent mistakes as to 
the existence of a legally enforceable trust relationship. 
 35. R.U.P.A. § 404(c). It is important to note that this section refers to the duty owed 
by partners to the partnership and to each other, not to the world at large. However, the 
duty of care as between partners is not the same thing as the duty of care owed by the di-
rectors of a corporation. Corporate lawyers are accustomed to thinking of the duty of care 
as relating solely to firm management. Indeed, it is impossible to think of the duty of care 
in the corporate context without immediately thinking of the business judgment rule. On 
the other hand, directors-qua-directors are not agents and therefore do not expose the cor-
poration to personal liability for their own torts, nor do they engage in the sort of hands-on 
interaction with corporate property which risks physically damaging it. 
 In contrast, RUPA’s duty of care is not limited to management and oversight, although 
partners do occasionally sue each other for negligent business management, and courts 
may then apply a partnership version of the business judgment rule. Bane v. Ferguson, 
890 F.2d 11 (7th. Cir. 1989). But see Shinn v. Thrust IV, Inc., 786 P.2d 285 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1990). Beyond poor management, however, the ordinary negligence of a partner may create 
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tort liability to others and hence losses to the partnership. Under RUPA’s default rule, 
such losses are shared by the partners in the same ratio as they share profits, which 
means (unless otherwise agreed) equally. Indeed, if a tort victim were to sue the ordinarily-
negligent partner without naming the partnership, that partner would appear to have a 
claim against the partnership in the nature of indemnification or contribution. 
 In addition, at least one of the concerns animating RUPA’s drafters was the problem of 
broken equipment. This is not a trivial problem in a small partnership. If a doctor drops an 
expensive microscope, or an accountant drops a computer, who pays for it? In practice, the 
answer to that varies from firm to firm, so the drafters opted for “gross” negligence as the 
default rule, which means that the firm pays for “ordinary” clumsiness unless otherwise 
agreed. 
 I attempted to persuade my colleague, the Reporter, that it was unnecessary, and indeed 
unwise, to create a mandatory fiduciary duty of care at all. Partners are profit-sharers and 
therefore have plenty of incentives to take cost-justified precautions and to monitor each 
other. If they know each other, they can account for differences in attention or dexterity by 
assigning high-risk partners to low-risk tasks. If they believe that they are all equally care-
ful, then they will foresee that they will all have accidents at about the same rate over time 
and will agree to internal loss-spreading. I succeeded only in persuading him that it was 
possible for reasonable people to take that position, see Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy 
Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership Act, 46 BUS. LAW. 427, 467-68 (1991), 
but remain convinced that I was right (for all the good that does). 
 36. At first blush, even a gross negligence standard may seem too low, since it con-
verts a command to “be careful” into a command not to be really, really careless. Lawyers 
drafting contractual liability clauses (and the clients who sign such contracts) nevertheless 
routinely limit liability to gross negligence under the apparent assumption that a jury ex-
ercising 20-20 hindsight will be able to distinguish “ordinary” lapses from “gross.” Still, 
“reckless” conduct is something even more egregiously faulty than gross negligence, and 
could probably have been omitted from the statute without losing anything. At least, I 
have difficulty imagining a fact pattern in which a defendant charged with gross negli-
gence would argue, as an odd kind of affirmative defense, that his or her conduct was actu-
ally reckless and therefore exempt from liability because recklessness is not covered by the 
duty of care. 
 37. It is not at all clear what “care” has to do with intentionally wrongful conduct. In 
fact, a partner’s intentional tort against a third party might not even create partnership li-
ability precisely because it is intentional. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Green, 593 P.2d 777 (Or. 
1979). See generally ALAN BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP § 4.07 (1996). In 
any event, the intentionally-tortfeasing partner is always liable for his or her own torts. 
Such a partner has no right to indemnification or contribution from the partnership, so 
partnership liability is a backup, not a substitute. If the intentional tortfeasor does not 
have enough assets to pay a judgment directly to the plaintiff, then giving the other part-
ners a right to sue for breach of fiduciary duty does not seem particularly useful.  
 The reference to a knowing violation of law is also puzzling. Remember that this is the 
duty of care; a crime against the partnership itself, like embezzlement, would violate the 
duty of loyalty. Perhaps the drafters envisioned a situation in which some, but not all, 
partners caused the partnership to engage in an illegal act intended to increase the part-
nership coffers, but which, after discovery and prosecution, resulted in a loss. In that case, 
if the non-violating partners sue, this provision would not allow the violation-causing part-
ners to argue that their lawbreaking was efficient ex ante, nor that, as the anticipated gain 
from the violation would have been shared, so should be the loss.  
 However, subsuming law violations under “care” creates an anomaly. Were the non-
participating partners themselves “grossly negligent” in failing to detect and prevent the 
violation? The argument that they were is not as far-fetched as it seems. See In re Care-
mark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (board of directors has an ob-
ligation to monitor law compliance). If they were, then in any intra-partner litigation there 
will be enough issues of contributory or comparative negligence (not to mention problems 
of inquiry notice for purposes of laches or the statute of limitations) to gladden the heart of 
any torts teacher. 
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 Third, the duty of loyalty, like all Gaul, is divided into three parts: 
(1) the duty to account for property, profits, or benefits derived from 
the partnership’s business or the use of partnership property, which 
includes partnership opportunities;38 (2) the duty not to deal with the 
partnership as an adversary or on behalf of adverse interests;39 and 
(3) the duty not to compete with the partnership.40 
 Standing alone, these three open-ended definitions of the duty of 
loyalty might have satisfied all but the most ardent of the tradition-
alists. They do not, however, stand alone. First, section 404(e) states 
that “[a] partner does not violate a duty or obligation . . . merely be-
cause the partner’s conduct furthers the partner’s own interest”; it is 
no sin to be selfish.41 
                                                                                                                    
 Finally, as noted above, the drafters were concerned with broken equipment. Perhaps 
the inclusion of “intentional misconduct” in the duty of care was addressed to the account-
ant or doctor on a rampage. While I find the image curiously entrancing—Casper Milque-
toast with a sledgehammer—I cannot believe that any such partner would think that the 
firm should absorb the damage and therefore refuse to pay the bill once he’d sobered up. 
 38.  R.U.P.A. § 404(b)(1). According to the Official Comments, the reference to misap-
propriation of a partnership opportunity is intended to codify case law, including that om-
nipresent classic, Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). RUPA does not offer any 
bright line guidance as to just what constitutes a partnership opportunity, although it does 
give partners the ability to do that themselves—maybe. See infra note 45. In any event, if a 
partner withdraws (“dissociates” in RUPA-speak) and the business either is not wound up, 
or the withdrawing partner does not participate in winding up, the dissociated partner is 
free to appropriate any new opportunities that float by. R.U.P.A. § 603(b)(3).  
 39. R.U.P.A. § 404(b)(2). Once a partner withdraws from the partnership, the dissoci-
ated partner may deal with the partnership as an adversary with respect to new matters. 
Id. § 603(b)(3). 
 40. Id. § 404(b)(4). The duty not to compete ceases on withdrawal, whether or not the 
business is wound up, id. § 603(b)(2), although the Official Comments note that a compet-
ing former partner may not use confidential information of the partnership and that trade 
secret law may also apply. 
 The question whether information “belongs” to the partnership or is simply an accretion 
to human capital and therefore the property of the partner is as complex as the law is con-
fused. A full discussion of property rights in information is far beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle; indeed, the topic consumes whole treatises. However, woe to the partner who gets it 
wrong or who “usurps” an opportunity. That partner has more to worry about than con-
structive trusts or even punitive damages. If the mails or a telephone or modem have been 
used along the way—and when will they not have been?—the partner may become an in-
voluntary guest of the U.S. government. The federal mail and wire fraud statutes apply to 
the deceitful misappropriation of confidential information, even if it does not result in any 
quantifiable harm to the “owner.” Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). Full dis-
closure before the fact eliminates the risk of jail time, United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 
642 (1997), although not the risk of damages. 
 41. R.U.P.A. § 404(e). So much for partnership as “a position in which thought of self 
[is] . . . to be renounced, however hard the abnegation.” Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 548. The Of-
ficial Comments state that this section is “new” and “deals expressly with a very basic is-
sue.” Official Comments to R.U.P.A. § 404(e). The explanation goes on to point out that 
partners are not trustees, and that a partner’s rights as an owner of a business exist as a 
counter-balance to his or her fiduciary duties and obligations: “For example, a partner who, 
with consent, owns a shopping center may . . . legitimately vote against a proposal by the 
partnership to open a competing shopping center.” Id. 
 In their treatise, Professors Hillman and Vestal and Dean Weidner argue that it is pos-
sible to read 404(e) narrowly. HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 204-05. Under a narrow 
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 Second, both of the fiduciary duties in section 404—care and loy-
alty—can be varied, within limits, by the partnership agreement. 
Under section 103, the duty of care cannot be “unreasonably re-
duce[d]”42 and the duty of loyalty cannot be “eliminate[d].”43 However, 
the partnership agreement may “identify specific types or categories 
of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly 
unreasonable,”44 and may also set forth a mechanism for authorizing 
or ratifying specific transactions that otherwise would violate that 
duty. Over-broad categorical waivers are thus forbidden, but some 
categorical waivers are permitted, and the border between the two is 
deliberately hazy.45 
                                                                                                                    
reading, it is merely an evidentiary rule which requires something more than proof of a 
partner’s direct personal benefit to establish a violation of duty but does not legitimate the 
immediate pursuit of self interest. Under a broader reading, however, the section would 
mean that a partner is free to be selfish, subject only to the specific restrictions contained 
in 404(b)’s duty of loyalty. They conclude, with apparent regret, that the drafting history 
favors the broad reading and the “sea change” in partnership law implicit in it. Id. at 205. 
 I have used the pronoun “they” in the previous paragraph because the treatise has three 
authors and the commentary is labeled “Authors’ (plural) Comments.” It is, however, clear 
to me, and I would think to anyone familiar with their collected works, that this section 
was written by Professor Vestal, with whom neither of his coauthors agree on almost any-
thing. Co-authorship, like politics, makes strange bedfellows. 
 42. R.U.P.A. § 103(b)(4). Given a standard of care limited to gross negligence, it is 
hard to imagine a reduction which would not be unreasonable. The Official Comments 
suggest that a pure heart/empty head standard might pass muster; on the other hand, ac-
cording to the Comments, “absolving partners of intentional misconduct is probably unrea-
sonable.” Official Comments to R.U.P.A. § 103(b)(4). Only probably? 
 One possible response to all this, at least for partners who want to get out of liability for 
violations of the duty of care altogether, might be to leave the standard in place but change 
the remedies for breach. After all, if a partner cannot be sued for damages, does it matter 
what the “duty” is? The relationship between duties and remedies is discussed more fully 
infra Section II.B. 
 43. R.U.P.A. § 103(b)(3). 
 44. Id. § 103(b)(3)(i). 
 45. The Official Comments to subsections (b)(3) through (5) state: “It is intended that 
the risk of judicial refusal to enforce manifestly unreasonable exculpatory clauses will dis-
courage sharp practices while accommodating the legitimate needs of the parties in 
structuring their relationship.” Official Comments to R.U.P.A. § 103. It is not at all clear 
how this fits with the statement just a few paragraphs earlier in the Comments that 
“RUPA attempts to provide a standard that partners can rely upon in drafting exculpatory 
agreements.” Id. 
 I do not intend to expound at length here on the difference between a standard and a 
rule, and there is obviously a continuum of legal formulation which runs from the hope-
lessly vague to the tediously specific. Nevertheless, as a general matter, the problem with 
standards, as opposed to rules, is that they cannot be relied on. It is for precisely this rea-
son that the ABA’s Committee on Corporate Laws adopted a bright line test for directors’ 
conflict of interest transactions in Subchapter F of the Revised Model Business Corpora-
tion Act (RMBCA): 
An inevitable feature of any bright-line statute or regulation is that, no matter 
where the line may be set, some situations that fall outside the line will closely 
resemble other situations that fall inside it. Some observers find that outcome 
anomalous and argue that a bright-line approach is inferior to a statement of 
broad principles. But the legislative draftsman who chooses to suppress marginal 
anomalies by resorting to generalized statements of principle will pay a cost in 
terms of predictability. The choice between these two drafting approaches is a 
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 In short, RUPA provides “mandatory minima”46 fiduciary duties. 
That they are mandatory explains why contractarians do not like 
RUPA; that they are minima explains why the traditionalists don’t 
like it either.47 
 As noted earlier, under RUPA there are just two fiduciary duties: 
loyalty and care. Before RUPA, some courts had held that “good 
faith” is a free-standing, independent fiduciary duty whose contours 
and content are unclear but which can be used to punish partners 
whose conduct the court does not like.48 One of the major changes 
made by RUPA was to remove “good faith” from the category of fidu-
ciary duties and convert it to an apparently contractual “obligation” 
of good faith and fair dealing in the discharge of a partner’s other 
rights or duties.49 
 While the obligation sounds innocuous enough—who, after all, is 
in favor of bad faith or unfair dealing?—it is not at all clear what it 
                                                                                                                    
matter of judgment; an experienced legislative draftsman would never write a 
bright-line constitutional “due process” clause, nor would he provide, in a busi-
ness corporation act, for a “reasonable period” of notice for a shareholder’s meet-
ing. 
Of course, that bright-line test in the RMBCA has itself been criticized, and in any event 
deals with clearance procedures for discrete transactions and not with categorical get-out-
of-jail-free cards (except to the extent that it does exclusively define what is or is not a con-
flict).  
 RUPA does permit the partnership agreement to include clearance procedures for au-
thorizing or ratifying particular transactions when an up-front, blanket grant of permis-
sion might violate the “manifestly unreasonable” standard. Official Comments to R.U.P.A. 
§ 103(b)(3)(ii). Thus, nothing in RUPA would prevent a partnership from adopting its own 
version of Subchapter F. The net result is to prefer transaction-by-transaction authoriza-
tion over up-front categorical permission, in spite of the burdensomeness (including rebar-
gaining costs) this may entail. 
 46. The phrase is Dean Weidner’s. Donald J. Weidner, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty: 
The Texture of Relationship, 58 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 82 (1995). 
 47. On the other hand, according to the Official Comments to subsection (b)(4), part-
ners can always volunteer for liability by increasing the standard to ordinary care “or an 
even higher standard of care,” whatever that is. Official Comments to R.U.P.A. § 103(b)(4). 
One does not usually think of a guarantee as involving a “higher standard of care,” but it is 
certainly possible that a partnership concerned with, for example, broken equipment might 
adopt a policy of “you break it, you’ve bought it” without inquiring into fault at all. 
 48. The duty has most often been litigated in the context of a partial or complete 
breakup of the partnership. When a partner is expelled without cause under an agreement 
that does not require it, the involuntarily departing partner sometimes claims that the ex-
pulsion is not in “good faith.” See, e.g., Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 
1998). Similarly, in an at-will partnership, the voluntary departure of a partner requires 
the liquidation of the partnership unless otherwise agreed. Some courts have superim-
posed a “good faith” requirement on the exit decision, thus converting an at-will relation-
ship into something else. See, e.g., Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961). 
 The fiduciary duty of “good faith” has long existed in corporate law, although without 
much explication. For example, in Delaware, good faith, care, and loyalty are the three os-
tensibly co-equal parts of a director’s “unitary” fiduciary duty. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 
Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994) (Technicolor II). But see 
Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5 at n.3 (Del. Ch. 2002) (treating good faith as a subset of loy-
alty).   
 49. R.U.P.A. § 404(d). 
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means in practice. The Official Comments tell us something about 
what the obligation is not. It is not intended to be free-standing, but 
rather is “ancillary.”50 Further, although the obligation takes its 
genesis from contract law, it is a mandatory term which may not be 
eliminated.51 The partnership agreement may, however, prescribe 
standards for measuring its performance if those standards are not 
“manifestly unreasonable.”52 
 On the most important question, however, the statute is silent. 
The meaning of “good faith and fair dealing” was left undefined; 
vagueness was a deliberate choice.53 Further explication is left to the 
courts. 
 It remains to be seen whether the judiciary is more likely to 
achieve clarity than the drafters were. As written, the obligation is a 
prettily wrapped empty box into which traditionalist judges can put 
the leftovers from the fiduciary banquet on which they used to 
feast.54 However, they cannot change the wrapping itself; presumably 
constructive trusts and punitive damages will not attend breaches of 
a mere “obligation.”55 
 It also remains to be seen whether judges will be given much op-
portunity to try. Here, the crucial change may be the change in 
available remedies for breach. Incentives to litigate depend very 
much on possible outcomes. The smaller the pot, the fewer lawsuits. 
Damages for breach of contract come in a much smaller pot. 
                                                                                                                    
 50. Hillman, Vestal, and Weidner say that this treatment “downgrades” the common 
law, HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 201, and was “motivated by a desire to thwart 
plaintiffs’ recoveries and judicial innovation.” Id. at 203. Once again, I detect the unalloyed 
hand of Professor Vestal, since the only citations are to his previously-written attacks on 
RUPA. His co-authors have been more generous elsewhere. 
 51. R.U.P.A. § 103(b)(5). 
 52. Id. § 103(b)(3)(i). Here, at least, there is some guidance as to meaning with which 
commercial lawyers are familiar. According to the Official Comments, this provision is 
based on UCC § 1-102(3), and is meant to include procedural provisions like specific time 
periods that constitute “adequate” notice (5 days in the Comments example). Official 
Comments to R.U.P.A. § 103(b)(3)(i). Of course, lawyers familiar with the UCC’s treatment 
of standards for performance are probably also familiar with the UCC’s definition of good 
faith and fair dealing; that is, as honesty in fact and, in the case of merchants, the obser-
vance of reasonable standards of fair dealing in the trade. However, that definition was re-
jected by RUPA’s drafters as “too narrow.” 
 53. It seems to me that this intentionally amorphous obligation was a political bone 
thrown to the traditionalists unhappy with RUPA’s narrowing of fiduciary duties. The 
drafting history suggests as much. HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 47-49. Of course, it is 
also possible that the deliberate vagueness surrounding this obligation reflects a punt 
rather than a tossed bone. Perhaps the drafters simply could not reach consensus on spe-
cifics and so left that chore to judges. 
 54. For an illustration of this form of argument, see Claire Moore Dickerson, Cycles 
and Pendulums: Good Faith, Norms, and the Commons, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 399 
(1997). 
 55. Weidner, supra note 28, at 908-10. 
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2. FRUPA  
 RUPA was adopted in Florida with its treatment of the duties of 
care and loyalty and the obligation of good faith nearly intact. The 
one change was in the definition of the duty of loyalty. While RUPA 
says the duty of loyalty “is limited to” its three exclusive categories, 
FRUPA says the duty of loyalty “includes” them “without limita-
tion.”56 The legislature was concerned that RUPA narrowed the duty 
of loyalty too severely, and wanted courts to be able to fashion other 
categories of loyalty violation.57 
 Nevertheless, partners remain free to enter into agreements that 
give categorical permission to engage in some kinds of activities (if 
not “manifestly unreasonable”) and which set forth procedures for 
authorizing or ratifying discrete transactions.58 Further, the stan-
dard of care remains gross negligence; good faith remains an obliga-
tion, not a fiduciary duty; and both are “mandatory minima” subject 
to some variation by agreement. 
3. The FLLCA  
 Now comes the first puzzle. The drafters of Florida’s LLC Act bor-
rowed FRUPA’s “[g]eneral standards of partner’s conduct” for the 
section denominated “general standards for managers and managing 
members”59 almost verbatim—with one important exception. The 
words “only fiduciary” have been omitted. Thus, instead of saying 
                                                                                                                    
 56. Section 620.8404(2), Florida Statutes, states: 
 A partner’s duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners includes, 
without limitation, the following: 
 (a) To account to the partnership and hold as trustee for the partnership any 
property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up 
of the partnership business or derived from a use by the partner of partnership 
property, including the appropriation of a partnership opportunity; 
 (b) To refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding up 
of the partnership business as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse 
to the partnership, and 
 (c) To refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the part-
nership business before the dissolution of the partnership. 
 57. COHN & AMES, supra note 24, at 242; Larson, supra note 11. 
 58. FLA. STAT. § 620.8103 (2001). Because FRUPA has broadened the potential num-
ber of activities that could violate the duty of loyalty, it is difficult to know what kinds of 
activities require advance permission, whether categorical or discrete. However, the areas 
most likely to require focused attention from the parties and their counsel are those al-
ready specified. 
 59. Non-managing members in a manager-managed LLC do not have duties under 
the statute. In this sense, they are “more like” shareholders or limited partners than part-
ners. I suspect, however, that a court would treat a non-managing member with voting 
control like a controlling shareholder, and that such a member would therefore have duties 
(whether or not denominated “fiduciary”) by virtue of control. The fact that the FLLCA is 
silent on the issue is unlikely to present much of an impediment. After all, corporate stat-
utes are silent on the duties of controlling shareholders, but that has not prevented courts 
from imposing them. 
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“the only fiduciary duties” are the duties of loyalty and care, the 
statute says each manager “shall owe a duty of loyalty and a duty of 
care.”60 
 According to the Chair of the drafting committee, Louis Conti, the 
omission was deliberate.61 In his view, if managers are not called “fi-
duciaries,” then their duties are merely contractual.62 Care and loy-
alty thus have the same status as good faith.  
 Of course, even if care and loyalty are contractual obligations 
rather than fiduciary duties, the statute explicitly states that they 
cannot be totally eliminated.63 As much as Mr. Conti (and I) would 
                                                                                                                    
 60.  Section 608.4225, Florida Statutes, states: 
 (1) Subject to ss. 608.4226 and 608.423, each manager and managing member 
shall owe a duty of loyalty and a duty of care to the limited liability company . . . . 
 (a) The duty of loyalty includes, without limitation:  
 1. Accounting to the limited liability company and holding as trustee for the 
limited liability company any property, profit, or benefit derived by such manager 
or managing member in the conduct or winding up of the limited liability com-
pany business or derived from a use by such manager or managing member of 
limited liability company property, including the appropriation of a limited liabil-
ity company opportunity. 
 2. Refraining from dealing with the limited liability company in the conduct or 
winding up of the limited liability company business as or on behalf of a party 
having an interest adverse to the limited liability company. 
 3. Refraining from competing with the limited liability company in the conduct 
of the limited liability company business before the dissolution of the limited 
liability company. 
 (b) The duty of care is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent 
or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law. 
 61. Louis T.M. Conti, Esq., Remarks at the Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education 
Committee and the Business Law and Tax Sections Program, New And Improved LLCs 
and LLPs in Florida: Understanding and Using the New Laws (Nov. 5, 1999) [hereinafter 
Remarks]. I am grateful to Mr. Conti and to the other participants in the program for wel-
coming me into their midst as a last-minute substitute for Dean Weidner, who was unable 
to attend that day. 
 62. Id. 
 63.  Section 608.423, Florida Statutes, which provides the same “non-waivable” provi-
sions as FRUPA, states: 
 (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), all members of a limited li-
ability company may enter into an operating agreement, which need not be in 
writing, to regulate the affairs of the company and the conduct of its business, es-
tablish duties in addition to those set forth in this chapter, and to govern rela-
tions among the members, managers, and company. Any inconsistency between 
written and oral operating agreements shall be resolved in favor of the written 
agreement. The members of a limited liability company may enter into an operat-
ing agreement before, after, or at the time the articles of organization are filed, 
and the operating agreement takes effect on the date of the formation of the lim-
ited liability company or on any other date provided in the operating agreement.  
To the extent the operating agreement does not otherwise provide, this chapter 
governs relations among the members, managers, and limited liability company. 
 (2) The operating agreement may not: 
 (a) Unreasonably restrict a right to information or access to records under s. 
608.4101 
 (b) Eliminate the duty of loyalty under s. 608.4225, but the agreement may: 
 1. Identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty 
of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable; and 
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 2. Specify the number or percentage of members or disinterested managers 
that may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material facts, a specific 
act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty 
 (c) Unreasonably reduce the duty of care under s. 608.4225; 
 . . . . 
Thus, like FRUPA, the statute permits the operating agreement to set forth “sanitizing” 
clearance provisions for conflict of interest transactions. However, another part of the stat-
ute, this time drawn from Florida’s corporation statute, makes it unnecessary for the or-
ganizers to do so. Section 608.4226, Florida Statutes, provides: 
 (1) No contract or other transaction between a limited liability company and 
one or more of its members, managers, or managing members or any other lim-
ited liability company, corporation, firm, association, or entity in which one or 
more of its members, managers, or managing members are managers, managing 
members, directors, or officers or are financially interested shall be either void or 
voidable because of such relationship or interest, because such members, manag-
ers, or managing members are present at the meeting of the members, managers, 
or managing members or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves, or rati-
fies such contract or transaction, or because their votes are counted for such pur-
pose, if: 
 (a) The fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the man-
agers or managing members or committee which authorizes, approves, or ratifies 
the contract or transaction by a vote or consent sufficient for the purpose without 
counting the votes or consents of such interested members, managers, or manag-
ing members 
 (b) The fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the mem-
bers entitled to vote and they authorize, approve, or ratify such contract or trans-
action by vote or written consent; or 
 (c) The contract or transaction is fair and reasonable as to the limited liability 
company at the time it is authorized by the managers, managing members, a 
committee, or the members. 
 (2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(a) only, a conflict of interest transaction is 
authorized, approved, or ratified if it receives the affirmative vote of a majority of 
the managers or managing members, or of the committee, who have no relation-
ship or interest in the transaction described in subsection (1), but a transaction 
may not be authorized, approved, or ratified under this section by a single man-
ager of a manager-managed company or a single managing member of a member-
managed company, unless the company is a single member limited liability com-
pany. If a majority of the managers or managing members who have no such re-
lationship or interest in the transaction vote to authorize, approve, or ratify the 
transaction, a quorum is present for the purpose of taking action under this sec-
tion. The presence of, or a vote cast by, a manager or managing member with 
such relationship or interest in the transaction does not affect the validity of any 
action taken under paragraph (1)(a) if the transaction is otherwise authorized, 
approved, or ratified as provided in that subsection, but such presence or vote of 
those managers or managing members may be counted for purposes of determin-
ing whether the transaction is approved under other sections of this chapter. 
 (3) For purposes of paragraph (1)(b) only, a conflict of interest transaction is 
authorized, approved, or ratified if it receives the vote of a majority-in-interest of 
the members entitled to be counted under this subsection. Membership interests 
owned by or voted under the control of a manager or managing member who has 
a relationship or interest in the transaction described in subsection (1) may not 
be counted in a vote of members to determine whether to authorize, approve, or 
ratify a conflict of interest transaction under paragraph (1)(b). The vote of those 
membership interests, however, is counted in determining whether the transac-
tion is approved under other sections of this act. A majority-in-interest of the 
members, whether or not present, that are entitled to be counted in a vote on the 
transaction under this subsection constitutes a quorum for the purpose of taking 
action under this section. 
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have preferred total freedom of contract,64 the statute continues to 
provide “mandatory minima.” At least, however, Mr. Conti believes 
the statute as written moves in the right direction. 
 I respect Mr. Conti, and I am fully sympathetic with his contrac-
tarian viewpoint. Nevertheless, I do not think leaving out the f-word 
makes managers “unfiduciaries.” For one thing, the statute makes 
them agents of the LLC65 and agents are by definition fiduciaries.66 
For another, there is not the slightest indication that the legislature 
noticed the omission.67 Indeed, it appears to have been overlooked by 
several members of the drafting committee.68 
 In short, I think judges will continue to speak of the “fiduciary” 
duties of care and loyalty, and will continue to make “fiduciary” 
remedies available to the extent permitted by other provisions in the 
                                                                                                                    
Under FRUPA, the default rule is that conflict of interest transactions can only be author-
ized or ratified by unanimous vote. Under FLLCA, the default rule is that a conflict of in-
terest transaction can be authorized by majority vote. That default rule can then be modi-
fied, either to specify categories or types of activities which do not require sanitization (if 
not “manifestly unreasonable”) or to set a different percentage for approval. COHN & AMES, 
supra note 24, at 368. 
 64. Remarks, supra note 61. 
 65. Section 608.4235, Florida Statutes, states: 
 (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3): 
 (a) In a member-managed company, each member is an agent of the limited li-
ability company for the purpose of its business, and an act of a member, including 
the signing of an instrument in the limited liability company’s name, for appar-
ently carrying on in the ordinary course the limited liability company’s business 
or business of the kind carried on by the company binds the limited liability com-
pany, unless the member had no authority to act for the limited liability company 
in the particular matter and the person with whom the member was dealing 
knew or had notice that the member lacked authority. 
 (2) Subject to subsection (3), in a manager-managed company: 
 (a) A member is not an agent of the limited liability company for the purpose 
of its business solely by reason of being a member. Each manager is an agent of 
the limited liability company for the purpose of its business, and an act of a man-
ager, including the signing of an instrument in the limited liability company’s 
name, for apparently carrying on in the ordinary course the limited liability com-
pany’s business or business of the kind carried on by the company binds the lim-
ited liability company, unless the manager had no authority to act for the limited 
liability company in the particular matter and the person with whom the man-
ager was dealing knew or had notice that the manager lacked authority. 
 66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). 
 67. It seems unlikely that a legislature which broadened the definition of “loyalty” in 
FRUPA because RUPA’s definition was deemed too narrow would turn around and casu-
ally eliminate all fiduciary duties in the LLC statute. Of course, the 1999 legislature was 
not composed of the same people as the 1995 legislature; term limits have created a revolv-
ing door at the Capitol. On the other hand, the 1999 legislature revisited FRUPA in order 
to change the LLP provisions, but did not alter FRUPA’s fiduciary duties. 
 68. The members of the drafting committee served as the “faculty” for the aforemen-
tioned Continuing Legal Education program. In their prepared materials, four of them re-
ferred to the “fiduciary” duties of managers: Mssrs. Felman, Weidner, Ames, and, curi-
ously, Conti. (I assume that the word crept into Mr. Conti’s materials by way of an assis-
tant.) Two of the members also use the f-word in their treatise. COHN & AMES, supra note 
24, at 367. 
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statute.69 It is even possible that they will ignore the missing f-word 
but seize on the missing o-word: “only.” Courts might take that as an 
invitation to return to the halcyon days—halcyon for traditionalists, 
anyway—of the galloping moral mandate with its ever-expanding, 
open-ended structure of fiduciary duties. The missing o-word might 
even lead courts to return “good faith” to its previous position in the 
fiduciary pantheon.70 Thus, a well-intentioned71 effort to restrict the 
scope of fiduciary duties could wind up expanding them, thereby 
proving the continuing power of the law of unintended consequences. 
 So if the question is, “do managers of a Florida LLC have more fi-
duciary duties than do partners, the same, fewer, or none at all,” 
then the answer is that they probably have the same duties as part-
ners, although I offer that answer with neither joy nor certainty. 
B. Wrongs Without A Remedy 
 This leads us to a second puzzle: why require “mandatory mini-
mum” fiduciary duties and obligations but deny any effective remedy 
for their breach? This puzzle exists because the process of “hybridiza-
tion” melded FRUPA’s standards of conduct with the Florida Busi-
ness Corporation Act’s (FBCA) exculpation and indemnification pro-
visions. 
1. An Overview of Exculpation 
 Once upon a time (but not so very long ago) in the world of corpo-
rate law, the only fiduciary duty that really mattered was the duty of 
loyalty. The duty of care might be a theoretical concern, but the 
business judgment rule protected directors against the consequences 
of allegedly improvident decisionmaking or faulty oversight.72 Then 
                                                                                                                    
 69. Under the statute, not all wrongs have a remedy. See infra Part II.B. 
 70. As noted earlier, one of RUPA’s major changes, carried over into FRUPA, was the 
distinction between the “fiduciary” duties of care and loyalty and the mere “obligation” of 
good faith and fair dealing. Under the FLLCA, good faith is still an “obligation” and is in 
its own subsection, Section 608.4225(c), Florida Statutes: 
Each manager and managing member shall discharge the duties to the limited 
liability company and its members under this chapter or under the articles of or-
ganization or operating agreement and exercise any rights consistent with the 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 
However, if care and loyalty are not the “only fiduciary” duties, then there is some risk 
that a court could fail to perceive the delicate—one might even say gossamer—distinction 
between a “duty” and an “obligation” in the same statutory section. 
 71. At least from the contractarian perspective. Traditionalists would not characterize 
it so benignly. 
 72. The business judgment rule is a presumption that directors act in good faith and 
with reasonable care. While in theory it does not shield directors from charges of waste or 
gross negligence, in practice there were almost no cases before 1985 in which a “care” case 
got past the pleading stage, let alone resulted in a remedy. Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 
683 A.2d 1049, 1051-52 (Del. Ch. 1996); Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy 
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along came Smith v. Van Gorkom,73 in which the Delaware Supreme 
Court held outside directors liable for “gross negligence” in approving 
a premium bid for their company’s shares, and the corporate world 
went into shock.74 Insurance premiums went up75 and there were sto-
ries of mass resignations from the boards of publicly held corpora-
tions.76 Even worse, at least from Delaware’s point of view, a number 
of corporate decision-makers started to consider reincorporating in 
other states.77 
 The Delaware Legislature could not do anything about the folly78 
of its supreme court, but it could do something—or try to—about its 
consequences. In 1986, Delaware’s corporation statute was amended 
to permit the articles of incorporation to include a provision “elimi-
nating or limiting the personal liability of a director . . . for monetary 
damages for breach of fiduciary duty . . . [except not] for any breach 
of the director’s duty of loyalty . . . [or] for acts or omissions not in 
                                                                                                                    
Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 
1078, 1099 (1969). 
 Again theoretically, the business judgment rule protected board decisions, not board non-
decisions, and therefore did not apply to “oversight” cases in which the board (or one of its 
members) was charged with a failure of attention. However, those complaints were also re-
jected, either for failure to prove causation, Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), 
or for failure to allege that the board was on notice of the need for attention, Graham v. 
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
 Since the mid-1980s, the business judgment rule in Delaware has gone through a num-
ber of contortions that have diminished its protectiveness. The process was sparked by an 
increase in hostile takeover attempts and the resistance of target boards, Unocal v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), then spread to negotiated acquisitions, Cede & 
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), and now, apparently, to executive com-
pensation, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). A full discussion of the current state 
of the law is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 73. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 74. The reaction and response is reported in Robert W. Hamilton, Reliance and Li-
ability Standards for Outside Directors, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 5 (1989). 
 75. The rise in premiums for D & O insurance was blamed on Van Gorkom, see, e.g., 
Dennis J. Block et al., Advising Directors on the D&O Insurance Crisis, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 
130 (1986), although a subsequent study suggests that other factors were at work. Roberta 
Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance?, 14 DEL J. 
CORP. L. 1 (1989). 
 76. Laurie Baum & John A. Byrne, The Job Nobody Wants, BUS. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, 
at 56-61. 
 77. Delaware derives a very large proportion of its state budget from incorporation 
there. See supra note 1. 
 78. Smith v. Van Gorkom has been described as “one of the worst decisions in the his-
tory of [Delaware] corporate law.” Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the 
Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985). The Delaware Supreme Court has 
since come down with two more that are at least as bad, Paramount Communications, Inc. 
v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 
(Del. 1993), and one that may join them in infamy if it means what it appears to say, Em-
erald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215 (Del. 1999). (A subsequent opinion suggests that it 
does, Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001), although Chancellor Chandler 
has made a valiant attempt to distinguish it.  Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 20 n.36 (Del. 
Ch. 2002).) 
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good faith . . . [or] from which the director derived an improper per-
sonal benefit.”79 
 At that point, corporate decision-makers stopped talking about 
emigration from Delaware and started a wave of immigration to it. 
In the next proxy season, a large number of publicly held corpora-
tions incorporated in other states sought shareholder approval to re-
incorporate in Delaware.80 
 Naturally, that did not sit well with the legislatures of the other 
states, to whom Van Gorkom had given such hope of gaining market 
share at Delaware’s expense. Now, thanks to the Delaware legisla-
ture, they were not only not gaining market share, they were losing 
it. Accordingly, most states quickly provided some version of exculpa-
tion from damages, either by giving permission to “opt in” or “opt 
out” of liability in the corporate articles, or, less frequently, by a di-
rect grant of protection by statute.81 
2. Exculpation in Florida  
 Florida not only jumped on that bandwagon early, but also 
adopted one of the most protective statutory exculpation provisions 
around. Florida directors are not liable82 to the corporation, its 
                                                                                                                    
 79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). Most Delaware corporations have 
amended their charters to take advantage of the provision. However, exculpation in Dela-
ware has not turned out to protect directors as much as its drafters perhaps intended. The 
statute does not define the duty of loyalty, but apparently it means something more than 
just improper receipt of a personal benefit (since that is a separate category). Under Dela-
ware law, conflict of interest and controlling shareholder transactions remain “loyalty” 
cases even if they have been approved by independent directors, Kahn v. Lynch Communi-
cations Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994), and those directors may be personally liable 
for improperly approving them. Emerald Partners, 726 A.2d at 1215. Further, “good faith” 
is one of the triad of a director’s fiduciary duties, Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361, and the 
statute does not permit exculpation for its breach. This has focused the attention of the 
plaintiff’s bar, and therefore of the courts, on the meaning of good faith (although more at-
tention has not resulted in greater clarity). 
 Finally, the Delaware Supreme Court recently held that exculpatory charter provisions 
are not self-executing; the burden of proof is on the director claiming protection to show 
that the challenged conduct is entitled to it. Emerald Partners, 726 A.2d at 1223-24. Since 
two of the major components of the settlement value of any case are the length of time it 
will take to get rid of it and legal uncertainty as to the outcome, the price of settlement in 
Delaware has presumably gone up. 
 It will be interesting to see if the Delaware legislature responds to this. Corporations are 
now the only business form in Delaware for which fiduciary duties are mandatory, so the 
legislature is obviously not enamored of them. On the other hand, Delaware has some in-
terest in maintaining the incomes of its litigators. The line between too much litigation and 
too little has to be drawn with a careful hand. 
 80. Such shareholder approval was readily forthcoming, proving either that share-
holders are rational and did not want managers to be overly risk-averse, or that manage-
ment control of the proxy machinery proved an insuperable barrier to free shareholder 
choice. 
 81. James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation On Director and Officer 
Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207 (1988). 
 82. The statute does not preclude non-monetary equitable relief. 
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shareholders, or to third parties for any act or failure to act, unless 
the director engaged in a violation of criminal law;83 derived an im-
proper personal benefit from a transaction;84 carelessly approved an 
unlawful dividend or other distribution; or (in a derivative or direct 
action by a shareholder) acted in “conscious disregard for the best in-
terest of the corporation, or [engaged in] willful misconduct.”85 
 The FLLCA changes the terminology from that used for corpora-
tions to that used in LLCs—for example, the word “directors” is 
changed to “manager” or “managing member”—but otherwise adopts 
the corporate exculpatory provisions in their entirety.86 Managers 
                                                                                                                    
 83. Unless the director reasonably believed it was not a violation at the time, or at 
least had no reasonable cause to believe otherwise. 
 84. The statute does not define the term “improper personal benefit,” but it does say 
that transactions that have been cleared by disinterested directors or shareholders are 
“deemed” not to confer an improper benefit. It also states that the clearance procedures are 
not exclusive and that other forms of personal benefit may not be improper. 
 85. FLA. STAT. § 607.0831(1)(b)(4) (2001). In an action brought by a third party, the 
standard is recklessness, bad faith, a malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of 
human rights, safety, or property. 
 Generally, in corporate law, directors do not have fiduciary duties to third parties at all, 
so it seems somewhat strange to find third party suits included in the exculpation provi-
sion. However, two early Florida cases held that directors could be liable to creditors in 
some circumstances, Beach v. Williamson, 83 So. 860, 863 (Fla. 1919), and Forcum v. 
Symmes, 143 So. 630, 632 (Fla. 1932), so perhaps the legislature had suits by creditors in 
mind. 
 86. Section 608.4228, Florida Statutes, states: 
 (1) A manager or a managing member shall not be personally liable for mone-
tary damages to the limited liability company, its members, or any other person 
for any statement, vote, decision, or failure to act regarding management or pol-
icy decisions by a manager or a managing member, unless 
 (a) The manager or managing member breached or failed to perform the duties 
as a manager or managing member; and  
 (b) The manager’s or managing member’s breach of, or failure to perform, 
those duties constitutes any of the following: 
 1. A violation of the criminal law, unless the manager or managing member 
had a reasonable cause to believe his or her conduct was lawful or had no reason-
able cause to believe such conduct was unlawful. A judgment or other final adju-
dication against a manager or managing member in any criminal proceeding for a 
violation of the criminal law estops that manager or managing member from con-
testing the fact that such breach, or failure to perform, constitutes a violation of 
the criminal law, but does not estop the manager or managing member from es-
tablishing that he or she had reasonable cause to believe that his or her conduct 
was lawful or had no reasonable cause to believe that such conduct was unlawful. 
 2. A transaction from which the manager or managing member derived an im-
proper personal benefit, either directly or indirectly. 
 3. A distribution in violation of s. 608.426. 
 4. In a proceeding by or in the right of the limited liability company to procure 
a judgment in its favor or by or in the right of a member, conscious disregard of 
the best interest of the limited liability company, or willful misconduct. 
 5. In a proceeding by or in the right of someone other than the limited liability 
company or a member, recklessness or an act or omission which was committed 
in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and will-
ful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. 
 (2) For the purposes of this section, the term “recklessness” means acting, or 
failing to act, in conscious disregard of a risk known, or so obvious that it should 
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and managing members may have a mandatory duty to refrain from 
gross negligence and a mandatory obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing, but they cannot be sued for money damages for breach of 
those duties.87 
                                                                                                                    
have been known, to the manager or managing member, and known to the man-
ager or managing member, or so obvious that it should have been known, to be so 
great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow from such action or 
failure to act. 
 (3) A manager or managing member is deemed not to have derived an im-
proper personal benefit from any transaction if the transaction and the nature of 
any personal benefit derived by the manager or managing member are not pro-
hibited by state or federal law or the articles of organization or operating agree-
ment and, without further limitation, the transaction and the nature of any per-
sonal benefit derived by a manager or managing member are disclosed or known 
to the members, and the transaction was authorized, approved, or ratified by the 
vote of a majority-in-interest of the members other than the managing member, 
or the transaction was fair and reasonable to the limited liability company at the 
time it was authorized by the manager or managing member, notwithstanding 
that a manager or managing member received a personal benefit. 
 (4) The circumstances set forth in subsection (3) are not exclusive and do not 
preclude the existence of other circumstances under which a manager will be 
deemed not to have derived an improper benefit. 
The previous (largely unused) LLC statute, which had adopted the corporate model for 
managers’ duties, also adopted the corporate exculpation provisions. The revised statute 
kept the exculpatory provisions while changing the duties to the partnership model. In ad-
dition to exculpation, the statute permits LLCs to indemnify managers or managing mem-
bers against expenses or liability under circumstances which parallel the exculpatory pro-
visions. Managers and managing members may not be indemnified if they are 
“adjudicated” to have acted in (more or less knowing) violation of criminal law, to have de-
rived an improper personal benefit, to have authorized an unlawful distribution, or to have 
engaged in willful misconduct or acted with conscious disregard for the best interests of the 
company. FLA. STAT. § 608.4229. However, they may be indemnified for amounts paid in 
settlement of a derivative action, although this obviously creates a circularity (manager 
writes check to company to settle lawsuit, company writes check to manager as indemnifi-
cation). That section also permits the company to indemnify officers, employees, and 
agents who are not covered by the exculpatory provision. 
 Although the statutory default rule is permissive indemnification, the articles of organi-
zation or the operating agreement can presumably make it mandatory. In either case, 
plaintiff members of the company are likely to find themselves financing the litigation ex-
penses of their opponents, at least to the extent of the plaintiffs’ interest in the LLC’s prof-
its. 
 87. There is a very real question whether partners could adopt such exculpatory pro-
visions in a partnership agreement. Under RUPA and FRUPA, the partnership or individ-
ual partners may sue partners who breach their duties or obligations. R.U.P.A. § 405 
(1996) (amended 1997); FLA. STAT. § 608.8405 (2001). According to RUPA’s Official Com-
ments, the partners may limit or contract out of their statutory remedies, but may not 
“eliminate entirely the remedies for breach of those duties that are mandatory under § 
103(b).” Official Comments to R.U.P.A. § 405. The Official Comments to section 103 in turn 
state that restrictions on limiting the rights and remedies for breach of duty are 
“implicitly” included in the list of non-waivable duties.  
 Thus, the commentary is vague as to the extent of the partners’ power to modify reme-
dies. HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 218. Can partners include an enforceable provision 
eliminating money damages for breach of the duty of care or the obligation of good faith? 
At the very least, the question is litigable, although the existence of exculpation-by-statute 
in the FBCA and FLLCA may buttress an argument that such an agreement is not con-
trary to public policy or “manifestly unreasonable.” 
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 This leads to a question that is perhaps of more interest to juris-
prudes than to practitioners: what do we call a “legal” rule that is 
unenforceable? Is it still “law,” or is it something else—a “norm,” 
perhaps? There is a burgeoning literature on the role of “norms” and 
extra-legal sanctions in shaping behavior, and I do not propose to 
replicate here the discussion of a topic which is consuming whole is-
sues of law reviews.88 It is enough to note that the duty of care and 
the obligation of good faith are, for all practical purposes, unenforce-
able.89 
 Since I would cheerfully eliminate the duty of care and the overly 
amorphous obligation of good faith and fair dealing anyway, or at 
least keep them around only as default rules,90 I have no objection to 
this. In any event, if the firm’s organizers want to volunteer for li-
ability, they are free to do so.91 
C. Self Help: Voting and Leaving 
1. The Approach of Partnership Law  
 Strong fiduciary duties are less important when self-help is easily 
available. In a partnership, the default rules provide that every 
partner has an equal voice and an equal right to participate in man-
agement. More importantly, every partner has the power to walk out 
and take a fair share of the assets with her, either immediately (if 
the partnership is at will) or eventually (if the partnership is for a 
term or undertaking).92 If the partner has made (or will make) an 
                                                                                                                    
 88. See, e.g., Symposium, Norms and Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001). 
 89. COHN & AMES, supra note 24, at 367. 
 90. Default rules do at least serve an information forcing function. Ian Ayres & 
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). On the other hand, contracting out increases transaction 
costs. I am not convinced that the duty of care confers any benefits that outweigh those 
costs, and I would be content to leave good faith to its appropriate role as an aid to the in-
terpretation of contracts whose drafters left gaps which require filling. 
 91. Section 608.4227, Florida Statutes, provides that a member’s or manager’s duties 
and liabilities may be expanded by the articles of organization or operating agreement. 
Thus, a limited liability company may “opt out” of the statutory exculpation provisions in 
whole or in part. In contrast, the FBCA does not, on its face, allow the organizers of a cor-
poration to opt out of the exculpatory provisions. According to COHN & AMES, supra note 
24, at 104, this means that they may not do so. (I should note that my colleague John Lar-
son does not agree with Mssrs. Cohn & Ames on this point, and I remain agnostic on the 
issue.) 
 A note of caution for those drafting operating agreements: Counsel accustomed to pre-
paring limited partnership agreements routinely include provisions limiting liability for 
breach of the duty of care to “gross negligence.” If such a provision is unthinkingly inserted 
in an LLC operating agreement, it may well result in the assumption of liability, rather 
than protection against it. 
 92. Under RUPA’s default rules, the manner of departure makes a difference. Volun-
tary departure from an at will partnership gives the dissociating partner the right to force 
the winding up and liquidation of the partnership. Involuntary departure, whether by 
death or judicial decree, gives the withdrawing partner or her estate the right to the fair 
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important contribution to the firm, the other partners have a strong 
incentive to treat her well.93 
2. The Approach of Corporate Law  
 In a closely held corporation, in contrast, the default rules provide 
that a majority shareholder rules and that a corporation, like a dia-
mond, is forever. Minority shareholders cannot sell their shares and 
walk away because, by definition, there is no market for the shares. 
They are thus locked in (unless, of course, they are frozen out) and 
may be subjected to various forms of oppression.94 
 The minority shareholder’s only leverage is a lawsuit (or the 
credible threat of one). If oppression takes the form of a cognizable 
breach of duty,95 then the victim may sue for damages.96 The op-
pressed shareholder may also petition for dissolution of the corpora-
tion in a state whose statute permits dissolution on that ground.97 
 In Florida, however, the exculpatory provisions of the FBCA mean 
that a suit for damages is doomed to failure unless the majority 
shareholder has been stealing from the corporation. Further, the only 
                                                                                                                    
value of her interest in the partnership. Both the liquidation and the buyout rights are 
subject to contrary agreement, and withdrawal in contravention of the agreement may give 
rise to damages. However, a court may not enforce an agreement which sacrifices the part-
ner’s entire economic interest without any reference to actual damages; the common law 
disfavors forfeiture, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 227(1), 229 (1979) 
and RUPA’s Official Comments. 
 Further, the right to walk cannot be eliminated by agreement; there is no such thing as 
an indissoluble partnership. A partner may face disincentives to leave, but she cannot be 
trapped in the partnership even if she volunteers for the trapping. One noted contractarian 
critic of RUPA added this departure from freedom of contract to his list of RUPA defects, 
Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 
BUS. LAW. 45 (1993), but it received far less fire from the contractarians than did manda-
tory fiduciary duties. 
 In this connection, it should be noted that one apparent reason for RUPA’s non-waivable 
power to withdraw was the personal liability of partners. HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, 
at 271. If a partnership adopts limited liability provisions, thus becoming an LLP, this rea-
son disappears. Nevertheless, the withdrawal provisions were not changed when the LLP 
provisions were added to the statute. 
 93. See HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 25, § 602. Thus, exit rights are a governance 
mechanism. 
 94. There are enough ways to oppress minority shareholders to fill a treatise. F. 
HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1996). 
 95. Some forms of oppression come in the guise of business judgments, and courts not 
attuned to the special problems of the close corporation may reflexively use the business 
judgment rule to protect the majority. 
 96. If the friction between or among the parties is sufficiently severe, lawsuits may 
have to be filed seriatum. 
 97. The action for “oppression” is recognized in a majority of states. Some of those 
states do not require that the complaining shareholder prove fraud or a breach of fiduciary 
duty; it suffices if the majority has acted in a way that frustrates the plaintiff’s “reasonable 
expectations” by, for example, excluding the plaintiff from management. Douglas K. Moll, 
Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 749 (2000); Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Op-
pression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699 (1993). 
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grounds for involuntary dissolution are deadlock, waste (and not just 
any old waste, but “material” waste), illegality, or fraud.98 The Flor-
ida courts have shown no inclination to stretch the definition of ille-
gality to include seriously unfair conduct,99 let alone to enforce the 
reasonable expectations of the parties.100 
 In any event, litigation requires fault on the part of the majority 
and will not assist the shareholder who merely decides that her time 
and money would be better spent elsewhere.101 Sensible attorneys 
therefore draft shareholder agreements that permit a “no fault” di-
vorce and, perhaps, assure the minority shareholder a greater voice 
in the firm before divorce becomes necessary.102 
3. The FLLCA  
 Attorneys advising parties who will have minority interests in a 
Florida LLC had better dig out the forms they used to use for closely 
held corporations, because the voting and exit provisions of the 
FLLCA are taken more or less directly from the corporate model.103 
In one respect, being a minority member is even worse than being a 
minority shareholder. Shares can be sold if anyone is fool enough to 
buy them,104 or at least left to one’s heirs, which may be particularly 
useful if one dislikes one’s heirs. LLC memberships are not transfer-
able, period.105 
                                                                                                                    
 98. FLA. STAT. § 607.1430(3) (2001). 
 99. COHN & AMES, supra note 24, at 6, 167-68. 
 100. The FBCA also gives the corporation or the other shareholder(s) the option to buy 
out the dissolution-seeking dissident for “fair value,” a term which is not defined. FLA. 
STAT. § 607.1436. If it means “liquidation value,” then the majority shareholder(s) can ap-
propriate the going concern value, unless liquidation value includes the possibility that the 
entire corporation could be sold as a going concern. COHN & AMES, supra note 24, at 171-
72. 
 In any event, this buyout right operates solely at the election of the shareholder(s) resist-
ing liquidation. The unhappy shareholder who petitions for dissolution is writing a call op-
tion with an uncertain strike price and does not even get an option premium. 
 101. J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed 
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977). 
 102. Hunter J. Brownlee, The Shareholders’ Agreement: A Contractual Alternative to 
Oppression as a Ground for Dissolution, 24 STETSON L. REV. 267 (1994). On the other 
hand, for some kinds of businesses, for example high-tech startups, a no-exit rule may 
make sense. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-
Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913 (1999). 
 103. Instead of one share/one vote, the default rule in the FLLCA is voting in propor-
tion to the profit interest. Thus, the “majority-in-interest” rules. FLA. STAT. § 608.4231. 
This is certainly a substantial improvement over the previous FLLCA rule, in which the 
defaults were set by capital contribution. FLA. STAT. § 608.4231 (pre-1999). However, it 
stands in sharp contrast with Section 404 of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 
which gives each member equal rights in the management and control of the business. 
 104. Assuming no restrictions on transfer. 
 105. A member may assign an interest in the membership, but that does not carry with 
it the right to become a member. Assignees have no rights other than the right to receive 
distributions. 
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 Sanguine though I am about the FLLCA’s treatment of fiduciary 
duties and remedies for breach, I do not agree with the choice of the 
corporate model as the default rule for exit. The drafters appear to 
have been influenced by the estate planners in their midst.106 Never-
theless, I think the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, which 
adopted partnership dissociation as its default model,107 is much bet-
ter. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 If Florida’s old LLC statute was an Edsel, the new one is a Tau-
rus. Lots of consumers are buying it, and for good reason: it’s a fine 
vehicle for ordinary small business enterprisers with reasonably 
competent lawyers or accountants who can tailor the default rules to 
suit the parties. These “plain vanilla” form consumers probably need 
not be overly worried about whether or not the statute’s mandatory 
duties are “fiduciary” or merely contractual; if they are lucky, some-
one who used the Florida statute for a more complicated deal will 
wind up spending the money to procure an authoritative opinion 
from the Florida courts. The statute’s mismatch between mandatory 
duties and the remedies for breach is not a problem so long as it is 
brought to the parties’ attention. After all, properly advised parties 
can volunteer for potential liability and its associated leverage if they 
want. Further, such parties will not be stuck with the default rules 
on voting and exit; their operating agreement will include a buy-out 
mechanism and, if necessary, custom-made voting rights. 
 However, while the Florida statute is fine for the mass market, it 
is not well-suited to consumers at either end of the spectrum: (1) 
those with high stakes, complex deals, particularly when some or all 
of the parties are also engaged in other, possibly competing busi-
nesses, and (2) those with simple deals but no professional assis-
tance. 
A. The High Stakes Deal  
 As written, the statute provides mandatory minima duties which 
are probably fiduciary—but maybe not. It provides an amorphous ob-
ligation of good faith, which is probably not a fiduciary duty—but 
maybe it is. It provides exculpatory provisions which nevertheless 
                                                                                                                    
 106. I am indebted to my colleague David Powell for informing me that the “no exit/no 
buyback on death” default rule is necessary to use the LLC as an estate planning device. 
See also Andrew J. Willms, Discounting Transfer Taxes with LLCs and Family Limited 
Partnerships, 13 J. TAX’N INVESTMENTS 210 (1996). 
 107. Articles 6-8 of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act track RUPA’s distinc-
tions between an at will organization and a term organization, and between “rightful” and 
“wrongful” dissociation, but in either case, exit is easy and liquidity—either immediate or 
eventual—is assured. 
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leave plenty of room for litigation about loyalty. One way around all 
this is to contract out of these duties entirely, which the statute does 
not permit. 
 Form entrepreneurs whose clients really want to contract out of 
fiduciary duties, and who want to be sure that a court will respect 
that choice, do have another option: Delaware. In a Delaware LLC,108 
fiduciary duties are default rules that may be varied or eliminated in 
the operating agreement.109 If the parties anticipate the possibility of 
litigation in the future (as well they might, since they want to con-
tract out of a trust relationship and the opportunities for litigation it 
provides), and do not want to travel to Delaware, in spite of its many 
charms, they may always include a choice of forum clause110 or an ar-
bitration clause specifying Florida as the arbitral venue.111 
 If enough form consumers buy the Delaware product, then per-
haps the Florida statute will be amended to make it clear that con-
tracting out is permitted. That is certainly the route I would recom-
mend. 
B. The “Do-it-Yourselfers”  
 One way for an organizational form to create value is by setting 
default rules that most parties would choose if they bargained. Form 
consumers shopping for an economy model probably would not con-
tract out of the duty of loyalty even if they could,112 so the default 
rules on duty serve them reasonably well. The FLLCA’s no exit de-
fault rule is another matter entirely. That rule must—and I believe 
will—be bargained around if parties are represented by reasonably 
sophisticated professionals. If it turns out, as I think it will, that 
most competently-represented form consumers are bargaining 
around the no exit default, then the statute should be amended by 
adopting the Model Act’s exit provisions. As things stand, parties 
                                                                                                                    
 108. Or, for that matter, a Delaware limited partnership. See, e.g., Sonet v. Timber Co., 
722 A.2d 319 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
 109. Counsel should recognize, however, that it is important to make sure the parties 
fully understand, and acknowledge that they understand, both the fact and the conse-
quences of contracting out. In this regard, the parties should also realize that full disclo-
sure assumes additional importance in the absence of fiduciary duties. Sonet v. Plum 
Creek Timber Co., No. 16931, 1999 WL 160174 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
 110. While making it clear that Delaware’s substantive law is to apply, of course. I 
leave it to counsel to decide whether they really want to explain Delaware law to an al-
ready overburdened Florida judge. 
 111. Delaware has already held that such arbitration agreements are enforceable. Elf 
Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 293 (Del. 1999). 
 112. Nor, in my opinion, would they contract around the statutory impediments to en-
forcing the duty of care or the obligation of good faith, since those duties serve no particu-
larly useful purpose. 
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who try a “do-it-yourself” approach,113 or who use the services of a 
general practitioner unaware of the need for a buyout agreement, are 
likely to find themselves unpleasantly surprised, and quite possibly 
involved in litigation, down the road. 
 My preference for the Model Act provisions is based only in part 
on efficiency (reducing transaction costs). There is also a non-
efficiency based normative component. 
 First, as written, the statute imposes a transaction cost tax on 
everyone who uses it, either in the form of up-front fees to profes-
sionals or in the discounted cost of anticipated future litigation ex-
penses.114 Second, the discounted cost of future litigation must be 
higher than the cost of planning to avoid it, or no one would make 
planning expenditures. 
 Thus, people who do not use professional assistance are paying a 
higher tax than those who do use professionals, although it is a hid-
den tax in the sense that they do not know that they are paying it 
when they buy a Florida LLC. Further, I assume that many, and 
probably most, of the people buying this product without professional 
assistance are doing so because they are sufficiently poor to make fee 
payment problematic. 
 The only apparent reason for the statute’s no exit default is to fa-
cilitate estate planning. I do not begrudge form entrepreneurs a re-
turn on their investment.115 Nevertheless, it is regressive to impose a 
tax on all form consumers, and a higher tax on those relatively poor 
consumers who “do it themselves,” in order to benefit people wealthy 
enough to need estate planning. In my view, regressive taxes are se-
riously unfair. For that reason alone, the statute should be amended 
to provide either a buyout or a liquidation right (or both) as the de-
fault. 
 
                                                                                                                    
 113. This assumes, of course, that unrepresented parties will not negotiate a buyout 
agreement because they will either not know what the default rule is or will not under-
stand why it matters. 
 114. Everyone incurs this cost, whether or not they actually wind up litigating. Dis-
counting requires only the possibility of litigation, not the certainty. 
 115. While economists see transaction costs as a deadweight loss, lawyers and ac-
countants see them as a livelihood. 
